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NuMBER 1

REI [TTITURS AND ADDITURS
LEO CAR1iNw'

THE term remittitur, well established by long and widely recognized usage, has more than one meaning in the law of procedure.
The term additur, so far as the writer is informed, has only one
meaning; but it is such a newcomer to the field of legal terminology
that it is sometimes clothed in quotation marks, or its use is
apologetically prefaced by the words "so called". Consequently, it
may not be superfluous to begin this discussion with a measure of
definition.
The remittitur involved in the present discussion, in its broadest sense, is the procedural process by which the verdict of a jury is
diminished by subtraction. The subtraction is usually of money,
but it may be of property.' The term is used to describe generally
any reduction made by the court without consent of the jury; but
the typical situation in which it is employed, and the one with which
this discussion is primarily concerned, is where, on a motion by a
defendant for a new trial, the verdict is considered excessive and
the plaintiff is given an election to remit a portion of the amount
or submit to a new trial. An additur, briefly, is the opposite of a
remittitur. In the typical situation, the defendant, on a motion by
the plaintiff for a new trial because of an inadequate verdict, is
given the option to consent to an addition to the verdict or, in lieu
thereof, to submit to a new trial.
Practically all courts in the United States have made extensive
* Professor of Law, West Virginia
1 Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal. 487, 40

University.
Pac. 798 (1895); Johnson v. Duncan, 90
Ga. 1, 16 S. E. 88 (1892); McAlister v. Mullanphy, 3 Mo. 38 (1831); Fry v.
Stowers, 98 Va. 417, 36 S. E. 482 (1900); Honaker v. Shrader, 115 Va. 318,
79 S.E. 391 (1913).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1942], Art. 2

REMITTITURS AND ADDITURS

use of the remittitur, and the additur has been resorted to sparingly, but the decisions are not in accord as to the proper limits of the
practice. The discord arises from a difference of opinion as to
whether a too liberal indulgence in the practice infringes the common law right to a jury trial, or violates constitutional sanctions
preserving the right. The question of constitutionality, frequently
before the federal and state courts in earlier decisions, has recently
been revived and comprehensively considered in the much discussed
case of Dimick v. Schied&2 where the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a five to four decision, condemned use of the additur and,
corollary thereto, expressed doubts as to the propriety of the
remittitur as approved in prior decisions.
Possibility of use of the additur seems never to have received
consideration in the decisions of this state. The remittitur has been
recognized and resorted to in no few cases, both early and late, but
its use has been limited as compared with the usage in other states
and in the federal courts. In none of the West Virginia decisions,
apparently, has the court entered into a discussion of constitutional
questions, or undertaken to justify its holdings in the light of constitutional provisions. In each case the question has been whether
to allow a remittitur would amount to invading the province of
the jury, or usurping the functions of the jury, without reference
to the Constitution, although it may have been assumed that invasion of the common law right amounted to a violation of constitutional guaranties.
There are two particular reasons why it may be profitable to
take an inventory and nmake an appraisal of the West Virginia decisions and constitutional provisions in a background of what has
been said and done in other jurisdictions. First, the West Virginia
courts will likely some day find it necessary to decide whether the
additur is to be adopted in this state and, if so, what limitations are
to be put upon its use. Secondly, since the local decisions regulating use of the remittitur adhere to a rule sanctioned only by a
small minority of courts in other jurisdictions - a rule which has
been unsparingly criticized as narrow and inexpedient by many
courts and commentators - a shift of policy by the West Virginia
2 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603 (1935). The first commentaries
were inspired by the decision in the circuit court of appeals, 70 F. (2d) 558
(C. C. A. 1st, 1934). See (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 333; (1934) 33 MIOu. L.
REv. 138; (1934) 44 YAL.E L. J. 318; (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1551. An excellent
review of the Supreme Court decision will be found in (1935) 21 VA. L. REv.
666.
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Supreme Court with reference to the remittitur must be reckoned
with as a possibility. If such a shift of policy is agitated, it seems
almost certain that the court will find it necessary, on account of
the peculiar nature of our constitutional provisions, to deal with
the question of constitutional sanctions, if consideration is given
to all the factors involved in a solution of the problem as has been
done in other jurisdictions.
An attempt will be made in this article to review all the pertinent West Virginia decisions and constitutional provisions. Prefatory thereto, an attempt will be made to outline the fundamental
features of the remittitur and the additur as developed by the decisions of other jurisdictions, and the views of courts and commentators upon controversial matters, but no attempt will be made
to cover all the procedural details, nor to analyze or cite all the
numerous decisions dealing even with fundamentals.
Although the remittitur and the additur may be looked upon
as equals but opposite in direction, and by proper analysis will be
found to be controlled by the same principles, there are reasons
why it will be convenient to deal with them in separate topics. First
there are a few distinctions between the two which, actually or supposediy, impose different considerations as to the propriety of their
use. Furthermore, as compared with the additur, the remittitur
has been dealt with much more frequently by the courts and the
limits upon its use more frequently adjudicated; for which reasons
discussion of the additur in the cases and the commentaries is
usually prefaced by a discussion of the remittitur. Consequently,
in this discussion it is proposed to deal with the remittitur, the
additur and the West Virginia law in three separate topics; the
first as prefatory to the second, and the first and second as prefatory to the third.

THE RErmmuR.
The remittitur is by no means a recent development in the
field of procedure. It is recognized in the English cases prior to
adoption of the Federal Constitution,3 was resorted to in the early
Virginia cases, 4 and was adopted in the federal procedure over a
century ago. The desirability of its use, to avoid the expense, de3 See Dhnick v. Schiedt, 293 'U. S. 474.
4 See Hook v. Turnbull, 6 Call 85 (Va. 1806); Cahill v. Pintony, 4 Munf.
371 (Va. 1815); Tenant's Ex2r v. Gray, 5 Munf. 494 (Va. 1817); Preston v.
Bowen, 6 Munf. 271 (Va. 1819); Gibson v. Governor, 11 Leigh 600 (Va. 1841).
5 It was first adopted in the federal courts by Judge Story in 1822, in Blunt
v. Little, Fed. Cas. No. 1578 (1822). See (1935) 21 VA. L. Rzv. 667.
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lay and prolongation of litigation incident to a new trial, would
seem to be beyond controversy if there are no countervailing considerations. Since the only countervailing consideration that can
be urged is the objection that resort to the practice may invade the
right to a jury trial, practically all courts permit use of the
remittiturO to the extent that, according to the views of the particular court, it does not interfere with a common law, statutory or
constitutional right to a jury trial.
The test of propriety is whether to allow the remittitur would
amount to substituting the judgment of the court for that of the
jury. Results from application of the test in specific cases will in
general depend uppn what the jury has to decide and. the manner
in which it is decided under all the circumstances of the case.
The primary consideration in those jurisdictions which entertain
particular solicitude for the preservation of jury trial is whether it
is possible, by reference to various factors and circumstances involved in the litigation, to determine definitely the amount of excess
in the verdict and so fix a residue in effect truly found by the jury
and not by the substituted judgment of the court. Among various
factors involved in such a determination are the nature of the
claim in litigation; the status of the evidence with reference to
different elements of damages or other components upon which
the verdict is aggregated; the measure of recovery alleged in the
pleadings; separability of the finding of liability from the finding
of the amount of recovery; separate findings by the jury with
reference to different elements of the claim; and many other circumstances not readily subject to classification, some of which will
be illustrated in cases hereinafter considered. In addition to factors
concerned with ascertaining the amount of the excess, other matters which receive consideration in determing the propriety of a
remittitur are the effect of legal error committed by the court;
discretion of the court to elect between allowing a remittitur and
ordering a new trial; and the necessity of consent by the parties to
the remittitur.
6See Comment (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 319, where it is said: "A few courts,
on the ground that the use of remittiturs is unconstitutional, refuse absolutely
to allow them, or permit them only when the exact amount of the excess may
be computed mathematically." The only American cases, Southern Ry. v.
Montgomery, 46 F. (2d) 990 (C.C. A. 5th, 1931) and Louisville & Nashville
R. R. v. Earl, 94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607 (1893), cited for the policy of absolute
refusal, are not very satisfactory for such purpose. The English case cited, Watt
v. Watt, (1905) A. C. 115, is the much cited case overruling earlier English
cases approving remittiturs. See (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 672.
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If the claim in litigation is so liquidated or certain that the
jury, finding for the plaintiff, could properly find only one amount,
as in an action on an ordinary promissory note or to recover a statutory penalty for a fixed amount, there is no substantial reason why
any court should not allow a remittitur of an excess in the verdict
above the amount of the claim, if it appears that excess is the only
infirmity in the verdict. In such cases, establishing the right to
recover, in effect, automatically decides the amount. Typical cases
which come within this class, it will be observed, are those in which,
on a default judgment, no writ of inquiry is necessary. It should
be noted, however, that an excessive verdict in such a case, depending upon the circumstances, might be open to suspicion as involving
passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, since under the evidence and the usual instructions given by the court it might be difficult to explain the discrepancy otherwise. 7 In such an event, a
remittitur might be refused and a new trial granted, as hereinafter
discussed, because of a doubt as to validity of the verdict respecting
the right to recover.
Although cases in which the claim is liquidated present the
most obvious situation for application of a remittitur, it is not
essential, even in those jurisdictions adhering to a conservative
policy in application of the remittitur, that the action in which the
verdict is rendered be one for recovery of a definite amount fixed
by the nature of the cause of action alleged in the pleadings.
Particularly is this true in actions for breach of contract, where
definite rules of law applied to plainly established facts frequently
indicate the proper measure of recovery." The same is also true in
7 It is usually held that mere excessiveness in the verdict is not sufficient
alone to show passion and prejudice. See cases cited in note 26 iafra. But see
Hook v. Turnbull, 6 Call 85, 88-9 (Va. 1806), where the verdict was for double

the amount alleged.

8Cases of this class will be illustrated by the West Virginia cases hereinafter reviewed. Additional illustrations will be confined to one other jurisdiction in which use of the remittitur is limited: Gibson v. Talbotton R. R.,
112 Ga. 325, 37 S. E. 365 (1900) (excess barred by Statute of Limitations
remitted); Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Benson & Co., 86 Ga. 203, 12 S. E.
357, 22 Am. St. Rep. 446 (1890) (excess due to inclusion in verdict of improper attorney's fee remitted); McConnell v. Selph, 30 Ga. App. 795, 119 S. E.
438 (1923) (interest improperly included in verdict under improper instruction remitted, together with additional amount to reduce verdict to amount
warranted by pleadings); Huffman v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 29 Ga.
App. 439, 116 S. E. 25 (1923) (amount of illegal lien remitted); Jackson v.
Doolittle, 21 Ga. App. 483, 94 S. E. 595 (1917) (amount of set-off established
by defendant's undisputed evidence remitted); Langley v. Simmons, 143 Ga.
699,85 S. E. 832 (1915) (verdict illegal against one of two defendants remitted
as to one defendant); Haley v. Covihgton, 19 -Ga. App. 782, 92 S. B. 297 (1917)
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many tort actions involving property," where property value supplies a sufficiently definite norm to measure the amount of
recovery. And even in other tort actions, although less frequently, there may be a remittitur, where, under definite legal rules and
sufficiently established facts, the amount of the excess may accurately be determined." In cases within the description in this paragraph, the measure of recovery or the measure of the excess is often
described as being ascertainable by "settled rules of law", 1" "fixed
rules and principles' 1 2 (or expressions of a similar import), which
either regulate the measure of recovery or indicate the amount of
the excess. If either of these elements is definitely ascertainable, a
remittitur may properly be allowed regardless of the fact that the
other, standing alone, would not be a proper subject for application
of a remittitur. A fair generalization of the theory applicable in
such cases would seem to be that a remittitur does not invade the
province of the jury, because the jury could not legally have gone
beyond the definite legal measure of recovery, or could not legalyj
have added the definitely measurable illegal excess, as the case may
be, and therefore the excess may be looked upon as a nullity or mere
surplusage, the parties having had a proper jury determination of
all the proper elements of the case as included in the residue after
severance of the separable excess. On such a theory, the residue
has truly been found by the jury and the amount thereof has not
been fixed by the court. The court has merely segregated the
residue from the excess.
In a third class of cases, the proper amount of recovery is
(portion of verdict including illegal lien remitted); Vigal v. Castleberry, 67
Ga. 600 (1881) (excess due to the improper interest rate remitted; Brinson v.
Reid, 107 Ga. 250, 33 S. E. 31 (1899) (amount due to illegal interest remitted.)
Numerous additional cases, not so significant 'because decided in jurisdictions where the liberal rule prevails, will be found in 46 C.J. 427, n. 95.
9 See Mayer v. Tufts, 76 Ga. 96 (1885); Carlisle v. Callahan, 78 Ga. 320, 2
S. E. 751 (1886). See many additional cases from states adhering to the liberal
rule in 46 C. J. 429, n. 96.
10 Piedmont Hotel Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ga. App. 672, 72 S.E.51 (1911) (action for unlawful arrest, damages based on one of several counts remitted);
Seaboard-Airline Ry. v. Bishop, 132 Ga. 71, 63 S. E. 1103 (1909) (remission
of improper interest found in a personal injury case); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
v. Myers, 50 Ky. 841, 151 S. W. 19 (1912) (improper item of $200.00 included
in verdict for surgical operation to be performed in future remitted in personal
injury case); McCallam v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 93 W. Va. 426, 117 S.E.
148 (1923) (action by infant for personal injuries, illegal amount for doctor's
bills remitted).
11 Vinal v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1 (1881), syl. 23 and page 60 quoting from Nudd
v. Wells, 11 Wis. 415.
1246 C. J.427.
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neither fixed by the nature of the cause of action alleged in the
pleadings nor determined definitely by fixed rules of law or legal
principles; but, within largely flexible limits, is left to the discretion of the jury. Included in this class are actions to recover
damages for personal torts, and preeminently personal injury ac,tions. In such cases ordinarily there would be nothing to indicate
that the jury had brought an improper element of damages into
the verdict, the excess being due merely to the jury's abuse of its
discretion and the amount of the excess, therefore, not being ascertainable by application of fixed rules of law or legal principles. 8
Wherefore, it is held in a minority of jurisdictions that to allow a
remittitur in such cases is merely to substitute the court's judgment
for that of the jury, and so usurp the functions of the jury.' 4 On
the other hand, the courts in a large majority of jurisdictions
permit remittiturs in such cases,' justifying the practice by arguments hereinafter indicafed.
In jurisdictions where the liberal rule prevails, the courts are
confronted with the problem of fixing some principle upon which
the amount of the excess to be remitted may properly be determined.
Examination of a number of typical decisions gives the impression
that most courts have adopted no definite standard for fixing the
amount of the remittitur, other than to reduce the amount of the
verdict until it is no longer excessive. Ordinarily the appellate
court merely approves an amount fixed by the trial court; or, where
the trial court has not allowed the remittitur, itself fixes the
amount, without reference to any standard operating within the
limits of maximum and minimum limits of permissible recovery.
If such a standard is to be adopted, it may conform to either
of three different possibilities, depending upon whether, in order
13 See cases cited in note 10 supra.
"Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Randolph, 129 Ga. 796, 59 S. E. 1110 (1907);
Tifton, Thomasville & Gulf Ry. v. Chastain, 122 Ga. 250, 50 S. E. 105 (1905);
Brown v. Morris, 3 Bush 81 (Ky. 1867); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Earl's Adm'x,
94 Ky. 368, 22 S. W. 607, 15 Ky. Law 184 (1893) ; Gulf, Colorado & S. F. Ry.
v. Coon, 69 Tex. 730, 7 S. W. 492 (1888). See additional cases in 46 0. J. 429,
note 13; 20 R. C. L. 316, note 17. Also see (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 319. The
W"Test Virginia cases will be reviewed in the concluding topic.
IS See the numerous cases cited in 46 0. J. 429, note 15; 20 R. C. L. 317, note
19. See (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 319. Many of these cases are personal injury
cases. Others are cases involving other personal torts, such as malicious
prosecution. The federal decisions have had much influence on the state
courts. Two decisions particularly, Northern Pacific R. B. v. Herbert, 116 U.
S. 642, 29 L. Ed. 755 (1885), and Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann,
130 U. S. 69, 32 L. Ed. 854 (1889), have been frequently cited, the latter as
dealing with constitutional questions.
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to avoid the appearance of invading the right to a jury trial,
solicitude is to be shown for the interests of one or the other of
the parties, or the adjustment is to be made realistically, with attention directed merely to the object of accomplishing a proper result under the circumstances. Accordingly, some courts, whether
through deference to the opinion of the jury which found the excessive verdict or because the plaintiff is considered the party entitled to complain because of the reduction, pursue the policy of
fixing the residue at the highest amount which, if found by a jury,
would have been permitted to stand. 1' Only one court, apparently,
recognizing that the defendant, who is arbitrarily compelled to submit to the remittitur, is the party entitled to complain, in order to
avoid any charge of denying him the results of a proper jury trial,
has pursued the policy of fixing the amount of the residue at the
minimum which, if found by a jury, would have been approved
by the court.' 7 Most courts, however, seem to pursue an intermediate course and fix the amount of the residue at what the plaintiff is considered justly entitled to recover; or, what amounts to
the same thing, which the court thinks a properly functioning jury
would have found.-" It may be somewhat startling to find suggestions in some of the cases to the effect that so fixing the amount,
since it conforms more nearly than any other amount to what a
properly functioning jury would have found, is objectionable as
invading the province of the jury. 9 It would seem rather remarkable for a court, in order to avoid the appearance of usurping the
functions of the jury, and to preserve the right to jury trial, to do
something which it thinks a jury should not do; i. e., approve a
16 An illustrative ease is Interurban Ry. v. Trainer, 150 Ark. 19, 233 S. W.
816 (1921), reviewed in (1922) 35 HARv. L. REV. 616. Cases sometimes cited
[see (1934) 32 MiCH. L. RLV. 540; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 320] for this proposition are not very satisfactory. They merely speak of remitting "the excess,"
and there is no definite indication whether this means excess beyond the maximum amount which would be allowed to stand, or excess beyond what is deemed
a reasonable recovery, which may be less.
See (1934) 44
'7 Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927).
YALE L. J. 325-6 commending the practice.
is Certainly, if the court is to fix the amount at all, neither party should be
heard to complain because the court fixes the amount of recovery at less than
the maximum which it would permit a jury to find. The plaintiff has consented to the amount fixed and the defendant is benefited by fixing any
amount less than the maximum. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Adams, 74
Ark. 326, 86 S. E. 287 (1905). "There is, then little danger in putting
the amount low, and the court should always go down to a sum which it can
feel certain that the defendant should pay, and which under the evidence the
plaintiff is clearly entitled to recover." Idem, p. 333.
'9 Idem, p. 332.
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recovery which is either higher or lower than a truly proper
amount, unless it adopts either the maximum or the minimum in
pursuance of one or the other of the policies noted above.
In one class of cases a remittitur is proper regardless of the
nature of the claim in litigation or of the standards by which the
amount of the recovery is controlled. It is a fundamental rule
of practice, at least in common law jurisdictions, that a plaintiff
is not entitled to recover a greater amount than he has alleged in his
pleadings. In a case where the amount of the verdict exceeds the
amount alleged, the amount of the excess is a matter of simple
mathematical calculation and the amount of the verdict may be reduced by a remittitur to the amount alleged. 20 This is a typical
instance where the amount of the excess is definitely ascertainable
by a fixed rule of law.
A rather remarkable conflict in the decisions is found when
circumstances indicate that an excessive verdict was due to what is
ordinarily described as "passion and prejudice" on the part of
the jury. It seems that a majority of the courts, even in jurisdictions adhering to the liberal practice in allowing remittiturs,
refuse to allow a remittitur in such cases, on the supposition that
the passion and prejudice may have overstepped a mere consideration of the amount of recovery and permeated the finding as
to liability, in which event it would be unfair to the defendant to
permit any part of the verdict to stand.2 Other courts permit a
remittitur in such cases,' and some courts even consider passion
and prejudice a circumstance peculiarly justifying a remittitur.'
Even in jurisdictions where the passion-and-prejudice rule forbids
a remittitur, a remittitur may be proper when it appears that the
passion and prejudice affected only the amount of the verdict and
did not influence the finding of liability; 2- 4 as when the evidence
l046 C. J. 427. In such cases a remittitur is proper even in jurisdictions
limiting use of the remittitur. The Georgia R. R. v. Crawley, 87 Ga. 191, 13
S. E. 508 (1891); Williams v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 9 W. Va. 33 (1876).
21 See the numerous cases from various jurisdictions cited in 46 C. J. 430,
note 30; 20 R. C. L. 317; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 321. Also see (1935) 21 VA.
L. REV. 671, citing Mrinneapolis, St. Paul, etc. Ry. v. Moquin, 283 U. S. 520, 51
S. Ct. 501, 75 L. Ed. 1243 (1931).
:2 20 R. C. L. 317; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 321. See cases collected in Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442 (1919).
23 See (1934) 44 YALE L. T. 321, citing cases from California, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Texas.
24 Whitney v. Kaliske, 131 Minn. 261, 164 N. W. 1100 (1915); Trow v. White
Bear, 78 Minn. 432, 80 N. W. 1117 (1899); Craig v. Cook, 28 Minn. 232, 9
N. W. 712 (1881); Belknapp v. Boston, etc. R. R., 49 N. H. 358 (1870); MeNamara v. McNamara, 108 Wis. 613, 84 N. W. 901 (1901); 20 R. C. L. 317.
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indicates that a verdict for the plaintiff should have been found
25
in any event.
It is generally held that a mere excess in the verdict will not
2
alone be sufficient to establish the fact of passion and prejudice.;
but it may be otherwise when the excess is extremely great.2" Of
course excessiveness of the verdict may always be considered along
with other facts and circumstances indicating passion and prejudice.28 Circumstances which afford a basis for recovery of exemplary or punitive damages are peculiarly apt to arouse passion and
prejudice in a jury. Hence where an excessive verdict includes
such damages, as a general rule there is a reluctance to allow a
remittitur in lieu of a new trial.29
Since a remittitur is refused in the passion-and-prejudice
cases on the theory that the whole verdict may be tainted with
passion and prejudice, it might be surmised that, even in the
absence of passion and prejudice, a remittitur would be refused
and an excessive verdict set aside if it appeared that the misapprehension on the part of the jury which caused the excess also led to
It is emphasized in these cases that this is particularly a situation where the
court ought freely to exercise its discretion in determiniing whether a remittitur
ought to be allowed or a new trial granted.
25 Puutio v. Roman, 79 Mont. 226, 255 Pac. 730 (1927); Matsuda v. Hammond, 77 Wash. 120, 137 Pac. 328, 51 L. R. A. (x. s.) 920 (1913).
26 Cook v. Globe Printing Co., 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 332 (1910) ; Huston
v. Quincy, etc. R. R., 151 Mo. App. 335, 131 S. W. 714 (1910); Henderson v.
Dreyfus, 26 N. M. 541, 191 Pac. 442 (1919); Davis v. Beider, 127 Ohio St. 564,
189 N. E. 851 (1934); Eleganti v. Standard Coal Co., 50 Utah 585, 168 Pac.
266 (1917). "If such were the rule, all cases in which excessive verdicts are
returned would have to be retried."
Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v.
Union Pacific R. R., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459 (1916).
27 The amount may be so flagrantly excessive as to be explainable only on
the supposition of passion and prejudice. The Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. By.
v. Story, 104 Ill. App. 132 (1902); The Belt By. v. Charters, 123 Ill.
App.
322 (1905). This exception is recognized in many of the cases where the excessiveness was not sufficient to apply it.
Following are statements taken from the Iowa cases, as reviewed in
(1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 563, as to the degree of excessiveness necessary to
establish passion and prejudice: "grossly excessive character", Brause v.
Brause, 190 Ia. 329, 177 N. W. 65 (1920); "they must be so glaring as to
shock the conscience," Wald v. Auto S. & E. Co., 190 Ia. 11, 179 N. W. 856
(1920); "the amount allowed must be so great and excessive that the jury has
been influenced to its verdict by passion and prejudice", Hall v. Chicago,
Burlington & Q. R. R., 145 Ia. 291, 122 N. W. 894 (1910); Ideal C. S. B.
Works v. City of Des Moines, 167 Ia. 517, 149 N. W. 640 (1914); "It must
appear that the damages are flagrantly outrageous and extravagant", Kness
v. Kommes, 207 Ia. 137, 222 N. W. 436 (1928).
Similar statements will be found in many decisions of other jurisdictions.
28 See Davis v. Reider, 127 Ohio St. 564, 189 N. E. 851 (1934).
29 Perhaps the best exemplification will be found in the Iowa descisions,
reviewed in (1933) 18 IowA L. BEv. 561.
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a misconception with reference to the right to recover; and it has
been so held.30
In some cases, where a remittitur would be proper if excess in
the verdict were the only error to be considered, a remittitur is
refused and the verdict is set aside because of error committed in
the course of the trial which may have affected the amount of the
verdict; "1 as where improper instructions are given,32 illegal evidence is introduced, 3 or the jury is guilty of misconduct.3 4 In
such cases the defendant is said to be entitled to a new trial "as a
matter of right". But even in these cases there is a tendency to
allow a remittitur and refuse a new trial, particularly where it is
practicable to segregate the excess due to the error."
Since a trial court has a general discretion as to whether it
will set aside a verdict and grant a new trial because of an excessive
verdict or will permit the verdict to stand, it is not surprising to
find that the court likewise has a discretion as to whether it will
allow a remittitur, or, in lieu thereof, order a new trial. 6 In case
of doubt as to which is more likely to accomplish justice, prefer37
ence for a new trial is indicated.
A remittitur may in the first instance be proposed in either the
so As where a misconception of the evidence may have affected both the
amount of the verdict and the finding as to liability. Lenzen v. Miller, 51
Nebr. 855, 71 N. W. 715 (1897).
31 46 C.J.428, 431; (1934) 44 YALE L. J.322.
3
OWest Coast Cattle Co. v. Aguilar, 22 Ariz. 484, 198 Pac. 1103 (1921);
Smith v. Dukes, 5 Minn. 301 (1861); Slatery v. City of St. Louis, 120 Mo.
183, 25 S.W. 521 (1894). For later cases, see (1934) 44 YALE L. T. 322.
33 (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 322, citing Silver King of Arizona Mining Co. v.
Kendall, 23 Ariz. 39, 201 Pac. 102 (1921); Foley v. Union House Furnishing
Co., 228 Mo. App. 1063, 60 S.W. (2d) 725 (1933).
34As where the jury finds a quotient verdict. Darland v. Wade, 48 Ia. 547
(1878).
35 "1However, there seems to be an increasing tendency to except from this
rule such errors as improper admission of evidence, submission of issues unsupported by evidence, errors in instructions, or misconduct of the jury."
(1934) 44 YALP L. J. 322, citing cases. See McCallamn v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 93 W. Va. 426, 117 S.E. 148 (1923), where it was possible, in a personal
injury case, to remit all possible excess due to an improper instruction.
36 The cases emphasizing this discretion are too numerous to cite. It seems
to be so generally accepted that little is said about it in the cases except to
approve its application by the trial court. The following are sample cases.
Northern Pacific 1. R. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642, 29 L. Ed. 755 (1885);
Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 32 L. Ed. 854
(1889). See Detzur v. Stroh Brewing Co., 119 Mich. 282, 77 N. W. 849, 44
L. R.A. 500 (1899).
37 Prosch v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. 553, 90 Pac. 920 (1907) (where the
evidence "was not uniform"); Ruff v. Georgia, S. & F. Ry., 67 Fla. 224, 64
S. E. 782 (1914); Rief v. Great Northern Ry., 126 Minn. 430, 148 N. W.
309 (1914).
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trial or the appellate court.38 If allowed in the appellate court, in
some cases judgment is rendered above for the residue, if the plaintiff elects to accept it; in other cases, the case is remanded to the
lower court with directions to permit the election.39
If the principle, hereinbefore noted, upon which a remittitur
is allowed when the claim is liquidated or the amount of an excess
is definitely ascertainable by fixed legal rules, is sound, it would
seem to follow as a logical consequence that the court in such cases
should have power to fix the amount of a proper residue and render
judgment thereon without the consent of either party. Particularly
should this be true in the cases hereinbefore mentioned in which
the claim alleged in the pleadings is liquidated and of such a nature that, on a default, no writ of inquiry would be necessary. The
fact that no jury is necessary, or even permitted, when there is a
default admitting the right to recover is sufficient to indicate that
the verdict found by a jury on an issue in such a case is concerned
only with the question of liability, and that the fixing of the amount
by the verdict is a mere formality. That this is true is amply illustrated by the fact that, when the issues in such a case are submitted
to a jury for decision, the court definitely instructs the jury what
the amount of the recovery must be if a verdict is found for the
plaintiff. At the least, if either party is to be given the privilege
of repudiating a remittitur in such a case, it should be the
defendant, on the ground of passion and prejudice or some other
ground which casts suspicion upon the verdict as a whole. However, the cases are few where arbitrary reduction of the amount by
the court without consent of the plaintiff has been approved.4"
As to the possibility of objecting to allowance of a remittitur,
the plaintiff has a monopoly of the court's indulgence. After the
defendant has made his motion for a new trial, he becomes a helpless bystander, awaiting the court's decision as to whether a re38 The West Virginia cases hereinafter reviewed will serve as illustrations.
For cases from other jurisdictions, see (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 319.
39 The West Virginia cases hereinafter reviewed will sufficiently illustrate
the practice.
40 See (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 320, citing Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 33
L. Ed. 110 (1888) ; Johnson v. Louisville & N. R. R., 204 Ala. 662, 87 So. 158
(1920); Barber v. Maden, 126 Iowa 402, 102 N. W. 120 (1905); Cazzell
v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8 S. W. (2d) 580 (1928) ; Bourne v. Moore, 77 Utah
184, 292 Pac. 1102 (1930); Borowicz v. Hamann, 193 Wis. 324, 214 N. W.
431 (1927).
Also see (1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 405; (1922) 35 HAmv. TL. REv. 616;
Duke v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 172 Fed. 684 (W. D. Ark. 1909); Becker Bros.
v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C.0. A. 2d, 1925); Duke v. Fargo, 158 N. Y.
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mittitur will be allowed and, thereafter, the plaintiff's decision as
to whether he will accept the privilege of remitting or submit to a
new trial. On the other hand, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to
submit to a remittitur. 41 He has his election to accept it or submit to a new trial; although, it is held, if he does accept it, he
does so unqualifiedly and cannot avail himself of any element of
coercion by way of accepting it under protest.4 2 In effect, it is
the plaintiff who is remitting and not the court. Neither party,
after the remittitur, is supposed to have any valid objection to
rendering judgment for the residue. The defendant is supposed
to have no cause for complaint, because he is supposed to have been
benefited by the reduction; and the plaintiff cannot be heard to
object, because he has voluntarily submitted to the consequences.
About the validity or fallacy of these propositions revolve the
principal arguments for and against the practice of allowing
remittiturs.
In most of the decisions where validity of the practice has come
into question, the inquiry has been simply whether indulgence in
Supp. 1009 (1916); Case v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 114 Miss. 21, 74 So. 773
(3917); Bare v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., 73 W. Va. 632, 80 S. E. 941 (1914).
Where the court has exercised the power the amount of the excess has
been free from dispute. The Wichita & Colorado Ry. v. Gibbs, 47 Yan. 274,
27 Pac. 991 (1891) (the proper amount fixed by undisputed evidence); Security Benefit Ass'n v. Mibby, 220 Ky. 330, 295 S.W. 164 (1927) (the proper
amount determinable from insurance policy sued on); Mullin v. Gano, 299
Pa. 251, 149 Atl. 488 (1930) (amount determinable by mathematical computation).
41 See citations in preceding note; 46 C. J. 432.
4- Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U. S. 41 (1895); Colorado City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901); Pensacola Gas Co. v.
Pebley, 25 la. 381, 5 S.E. 593 (1889) (plaintiff estopped by his consent);
Young v. Cowden, 98 Tenn. 577, 40 S.W. 1088 (1897); Lynchburg Telephone
Co. v. Booker, 103 Va. 594, 50 S.E. 148 (1905). A remittitur under protest
should be rejected by the court. Massadillo v. Nashville, etc. Ry., 89 Tenn.
661, 15 S.W. 445 (1891).
By statute in some states the plaintiff is permitted to accept the remittitur under protest and seek a reinstatement of the verdict in an appellate
court, as in Virginia.
"In any action at law in which the trial court shall require a plaintiff
to remit a part of his recovery, as ascertained by the verdict of a jury, or
else submit to a new trial, such plaintiff may remit and accept judgment of
the court thereon for the reduced sum under protest, but, notwithstanding such
remittitur and acceptance, if under protest, the judgment of the court in requiring him to remit may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals upon
a writ of error awarded the plaintiff as in other actions at law; and in any
such case in which a writ of error is awarded the defendant, the judgment of
the court in requiring such remittitur may be the subject of review by the
Supreme Court of Appeals, regardless of the amount." VA. CoDn (1936) § 6335.
There still may be an element of coercion if the amount of the remittitur
is so small that prudence would impel the plaintiff to accede to it rather than
incur the expense and delay of a new trial or an appeal.
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the practice amounts to a denial of the essentials of a jury trial
to either of the parties, or, as expressed in a frequently recurring
phrase, whether resort to the practice "invades the province of the
jury". In how many of these cases, constitutional sanctions not
being mentioned, the courts have had in mind merely the common
law right to a jury trial, regardless of constitutional guaranties, it
is impossible to tell; since, where the common law prevails, jury
trial is the normal mode of trial, and, independently of constitutional limitations, a party should not be deprived of it without his consent or statutory alteration of the practice. No doubt in many of
the cases the courts have had in mind, although not made articulate,
the idea of a jury trial, not only prescribed by the common law
as the proper method of trial, but also sanctioned by constitutional
provisions. In no few cases, the major inquiry centers directly
upon questions of constitutionality. Consequently, an inquiry into
the validity of the practice of allowing remittiturs may involve one
or both of two major considerations: first, whether resort to the
practice violates the common law right to a jury trial; and secondly, if so, whether the violation is of such a nature as to come within
the prohibition of constitutional guaranties.
In dealing with the first inquiry, it is perhaps unfortunate to
employ such expressions as "invade the province of the jury", because of false implications which may arise. The normal province
of the jury is invaded in dfferent ways accepted by the common
law or prescribed by statutes in various jurisdictions. The two
prominent devices developed and approved by the common law
having such an effect are the demurrer to the evidence and the
motion to direct a verdict on insufficiency or a preponderance of
the evidence. A device developed principally by statute is the practice of rendering judgment non obstante veredicto when a verdict
is not supported by the evidence. 43 The question, essentially, is not
whether the normal functions of the jury are invaded, but how
they are invaded. By the three devices mentioned a decision of the
right to recover is taken away from the jury, but the parties are
supposed to get the same results out of a decision by the court that
they would have got by the verdict of a properly functioning jury
in the normal course of procedure. At any rate, whichever way
the court decides the case, there is no room for varying the measure
43 This device, although enjoying a more respectable career in recent years,
was originally condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States as invading the province of the jury. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S.
364, 33 S. Ct. 523, 57 L. Ed. 879 (1913).
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of relief within the bounds of the decision, a determination of the
amount of the recovery, where unliquidated damages are involved, being left to the jury. Such is not true where a remittitur
is allowed and the court fixes the amount of the recovery in a
case where there is no definite measure of damages, as in a personal
injury case. The excessive verdict, whatever effect may be conceded
to it in other respects, can under no stretch of imagination serve
as a measure of the proper amount of recovery, and there is no
warranty that the amount fixed by the court will even closely
approximate the amount which might legitimately be found by a
properly functioning jury on a new trial exercising the large measure of discretion to which it is entitled in such cases. It is believed
that failure to recognize distinctions such as these is largely responsible for unwarranted assumptions in many of the arguments
advanced to justify the remittitur, some of which will be noted
hereinafter. The essential inquiry should be, not whether in the
abstract the court has power to modify the normal course of a
jury trial, but whether what the court does can be accepted as a
comparable substitute for what a properly functioning jury would
have done under the same circumstances.
There is not much difficulty in justifying a remittitur in any
case so far as the plaintiff's rights are concerned. The court must
already have decided that the verdict is excessive and could not be
allowed to stand before the privilege of a remittitur can be offered.
In such a case, if the rule were that the law allowed no remittitur,
the plaintiff would inevitably suffer the consequences of a new
trial. The fact that he is offered the privilege of a remittitur, disregarding possibilities of coercion heretofore noted," does not prevent him from accepting the alternative of a new trial if he so
desires. Any rights that he may have had to a new trial are relinquished by consent. The real difficulty (which, strange to say,
the courts usually disregard or dispose of summarily 45) comes when
an attempt is made to justify the remittitur, in a case involving
unliquidated damages, with respect to the rights of the defendant.
Arguments advanced by the courts and commentators justifying
the remittitur in controversial cases have been fairly well summarized in the commentaries quoted below. The first, from the
Yale Law Journal,4" is an excerpt from the only legal periodical
note 42 supra.
45 On the naive assumption that the defendant is benefited by the reduction.
40 (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 318, 320.
44 See
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cited in Dimick v. Schiedt.47 The second, a commentary by Professor Scott of the Harvard Law School,4 has been taken from a
quotation in the VirginiaLaw Review, 49 where it is said to be "perhaps the best argument sustaining the remittitur". Contrary arguments will be presented in the form of replies to these commentaries.
"The power of the court to determine whether the damages awarded are excessive is said necessarily to imply
authority to determine an amount that would not be excessive."
Consequently, in giving the plaintiff an option to remit the
excess or submit to a new trial, the judge is not usurping the
function of the jury by arbitrarily fixing the amount of the
recovery, but is merely indicating the greatest amount which
could have been allowed to stand. 1 The plaintiff who has
voluntarily accepted the remittitur is not prejudiced and
therefore caunot later complain of the court's action.5
The
defendant is deprived of no right, and
since he is benefitted
3
by the reduction, he cannot object."Ir
"The plaintiff cannot object, for he is precluded by his
consent. The defendant should not be allowed to object for
he is not compelled to pay more than the jury might properly
award and did in fact award. The court is not substituting its
judgment for that of the jury; it is not deciding what amount
the plaintiff ought to recover; it is merely deciding that a part
of what the jury awarded was not an excessive amount."
Referring to the statements in the first two sentences quoted
from the Yale Law Journal,it may be admitted that the court has
power to determine an amount which is not excessive. Any reason
which would incapacitate the court to do this would necessarily
create an equal incapacity to determine that the verdict was excessive. But the conclusion that, since the court has power to determine what is the minimum excess, therefore it may fix the
amount of the residue without usurping a function of the jury,
47 293 U. S. 474 (1935), at page 490 of the dissenting opinion.
48 SCOTT, FUNDAMENTALS OP PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAw
49 (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 666, 672.
5

(1922) 122.

oCiting Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 74

(1888).

51 Citing Florida East Coast Ry. v. Ifayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504, 506

(1914).

U Citing National Malleable Castings Co. v. Iroquois Steel & Iron Co., 333
Ill. 588, 165 N. E. 199 (1920); O'Connor v. Pawling & Harnishfeger Co., 191
Wis. 323, 210 N. W. 696 (1926).
53 Citing Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 69, 74
(1888); Boyer v. Auduiza, 90 Ore. 163, 175 Pac. 853 (1918); Weatherspoon
v. Stackland, 127 Ore. 450, 271 Pac. 741 (1928).
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does not follow. Particularly would the conclusion not follow if,
as suggested by the commentator, the residue were fixed at "the
greatest amount which could have been allowed to stand". Such
a practice would deprive the plaintiff of any substantial ground
for complaint, if any justification other than his consent were
necessary, but it would not help the defendant. So far as the
defendant is concerned, it makes no difference whether the statement which says that "the judge is not usurping the function of
the jury" refers to the jury which found the excessive verdict or
to a jury in the abstract. It is idle to contemplate usurping the
function of the jury which found the excessive verdict, because it
did not function as a proper jury; and there is no way to tell to
what extent the result of the court's action allowing the remittitur
vould approximate the result of a new trial with a properly
functioning jury.
The final statement in the Yale commentary to the effect that
the defendant cannot object, "since he is benefitted by the reduetion", rests wholly on assumption. The statement would be
true if it could be assumed that the only way to relieve the defendant from the consequences of an excessive verdict would be to
reduce the amount of the verdict, but such an assumption overlooks
the possibilities inherent in a new trial. The defendant can be considered benefited by the reduction only on the assumption that
he could not have a new trial; or that, if a new trial were granted,
he would not ultimately be found liable for an amount still less
than the amount of the residue fixed by the court. If the amount
of the verdict should be reduced to the minimum which the court
would permit to stand, as under the Wisconsin practice, then it
could truly be said that the defendant had benefited by the reduction.
Although the subtlety of the argument in Professor Scott's
commentary must be conceded, its validity may be questioned in
the light of analysis. He says "The defendant should not be
allowed to object for he is not compelled to pay more than the jury
might properly award and did in fact award". It will be noted
that this statement relies on two factors to justify the remittitur:
(1) that the jury might properly have found the amount fixed by
the remittitur; and (2) that the jury actually did award that
amount.
With all deference, it is submitted that error in the excessive
verdict cannot be cured by selecting for the basis of a remittitur
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any specific amount, within the limits of toleration, and assuming
that the defendant may be compelled to accept that amount without
valid ground for objection, merely because the jury might have
found the same amount. The jury, functioning properly, might
have found that amount, but it also might, to the advantage of the
defendant, have found many different less amounts; and so might
another jury functioning properly on a new trial.
Again with all deference, it is submitted that to assume that
the jury found the reduced amount, merely because it found a
larger amount from which the reduced amount could be subtracted,
is to make a false application of the mathematical formula that the
whole includes the part. The amount is divisible, but there is only
one verdict and it, as a verdict, is not divisible. If the jury in any
proper sense found the amount fixed by the remittitur, it also in the
same sense, with equal effect, found numerous other less amounts,
any one of which might have been selected by the court as the
basis for a remittitur, or might be found by a properly functioning
jury on a new trial. When the court is compelled to select the
amount which the jury could properly have found, because the jury
itself has proved an unreliable finder of amounts, it would seem to
be reasoning somewhat in a circle to say that the court can resort
to anything that the jury did to justify the amount fixed by the
court. In truth, the jury has found only one amount - the amount
which it thinks the defendant ought to pay, if not what it thinks
the plaintiff is entitled to recover. The mere fact that this amount
is mathematically divisible or separable into different amounts
does not establish that the verdict itself is divisible into separate
verdicts. If the jury had actually found, as a measure of recovery,
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the reduced amount, its
verdict would have been for that amount without the excess. In
finding the excessive verdict, the jury has in no sense furnished a
scale for measurement of a proper amount of recovery. It has
merely driven two stakes, one of them entirely beyond the bounds of
the premises to be measured. The amount fixed by the court could
have been determined as easily if the jury had found no verdict at
all.
What has been said may serve as a reply to the statement that
"the court is not substituting its judgment for that of the jury".
It remains to give attention to the statement that the court "is not
deciding what amount the plaintiff ought to recover; it is merely
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deciding that a part of what the jury awarded was not an excessive amount."
First, it is said that the court does not decide "what amount
the plaintiff ought to recover". But surely somebody must decide this, if there is to be any pretense of doing justice; if not the
court, then necessarily the jury. There does not, however, seem
to be any implication throughout the whole commentary that the
jury has performed this function. Even if it is true, in accord with
the theory of prior statements made by the commentator, that the
jury has found various separable amounts within the range of
toleration, some one of which might have been selected by it as the
proper measure of recovery, the jury has made no such selection.
The only amount designated by it is excessive and does not decide
what amount the plaintiff ought to have.
It is further said that all the court does in allowing a remittitur
is to decide "that a part of what the jury awarded was not an
excessive amount". But this amount might be the maximum
amount which any jury could properly find. It is not necessarily,
nor likely, the amount which a properly functioning jury would
find on a new trial, nor even the amount which the court thinks
the plaintiff ought to have, if, in the words of the commentator, the
court does not decide "what amount the plaintiff ought to recover". In brief, the jury has found an excessive amount and the
court has fixed an amount which is not excessive, but nobody has
undertaken to decide what the plaintiff really ought to have.5
In some jurisdictions the defendant, in effect, is told to be
satisfied with the consequences of a remittitur because his lot might
have been worse. The trial court has an absolute discretion as to
whether it will grant or refuse a new trial because of an excessive
verdict 5 The practice of allowing a remittitur without the defendant's consent is justified on the theory that he can have no
ground for complaint, because the court in any event has absolute
power to render judgment against him on the excessive verdict and,
being unable to seek appellate relief, he would have to abide the
consequenees.5 I This may be a neat formula for telling the defendant to keep his mouth shut; but, if the practice of granting
5 See (1935) 21 VA. L. Rsv. 666, and (1934) 32 MIcH. L. REv. 538, opposing
the theories on which the Yale and Scott arguments are based. Also see (1934)
48 Haav. L. Rnv. 333.
5 This has been the rule in the federal courts. See Dimick v. Sehiedt, 293
U. S. 474, 489 (1935).
50 See dissenting opinion in Diniek v. Sehiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 488 (1935);
21 VA. L. REv. 670-672.
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new trials, even under the hazard of the court's absolute discretion,
is recognized at all as a method of relieving the defendant from
the consequences of an excessive verdict, it would seem to be something a little short of justice and consistency to tell the defendant
that he is entitled to a new trial because the jury has not treated
him fairly, and then to tell him that he must forego the privilege
because the court and the plaintiff have agreed upon a scheme for
57
disposing of the case without the aid of a jury.
No doubt the courts and the commentators are impelled to a
preference for the remittitur principally by a desire to end
litigation and avoid the undesirable consequences of a new trial;
but it may be suspected, particularly because of the liberties that
are taken with verdicts and the artificial arguments that are advanced in justification thereof, that there is at least a subconscious
tendency to look upon determination of the amount of the recovery
as in some degree an inconsequential element of the litigation, and
so to be taken away from the jury and treated arbitrarily in order
to dispose of the case. If there is such a tendency, it is justified
neither by the law nor by proper consideration for the rights of the
parties. Determination of the quantum of damages has always
been considered peculiarly a function of the jury. This fact is
particularly revealed when something has happened in the course
of the litigation to separate the determination of liability from
determination of the amount of the recovery. When the right to
recover has been determined by a default, by nit dicit, or by the
court on a demurrer to the evidence or a motion to direct a verdict,
if the claim is unliquidated, determination of the amount of the
damages is left to the jury.5 8 TUnder the original common law practice, the court did not even officiate at the execution of a writ of
inquiry, the jury performing its functions under supervision of the
sheriff.' 9 So far as interests of the parties are concerned, a proper
determination of the amount of the recovery is frequently of much
more importance thhn a determination of the right to recover. Considering all these facts, it should not seem surprising that deterr See (1935) 21 VA. L. Rzv. 671-2, attacking the soundness of the practice
by way of demonstrating that the court's absolute discretion is applicable only
to the extent of determining whether there ought to be a new trial, and not to
a determination of the proper course of procedure after it has been decided
that a new trial ought to be granted.
58 Hickman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 30 W. Va. 296, 299-300, 4 S. E.

654, 7 S. E. 455 (1887).
59Idem, page 300.
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mination of the amount of the recovery has been held to be a part
of the jury trial guaranteed by the constitutions."
Most courts find no difficulty in recognizing constitutionality
of the practice of allowing remittiturs when the claim in litigation
is by its nature definite and fixed in amount, or where the proper
amount of recovery can definitely be determined under fixed rules
of law on principles hereinbefore noted. The real controversy arises
in cases where no definite standards fix the amount of the recovery
and a determination thereof lies largely within the discretion of

the jury.
Since determination of the amount of the recovery is considered a part of the jury trial guaranteed by the constitutions, it
would seem surprising that in so many of the decisions discussing
the propriety of the remittitur as affecting the functions of the
jury the question of constitutionality is not expressly considered.
For example, it seems strange to observe that the Supreme Court
of the United States, under one of the few constitutions which
most emphatically guarantee the right to jury trial, in its earlier
decisions approving remittiturs, disposed of questions of propriety
without referring to the Constitution ;61 and that the West Virginia
Supreme Court, under similar constitutional provisions, has pursued a like course throughout the whole series of its decisions. In
such cases determination of propriety of the practice is permitted
to rest upon an inquiry merely as to whether allowing the remittitur
interferes with the essential processes of a common law jury trial.
Of course, if this question is answered in the negative, as it is in
most jurisdictions, it would be superfluous to inquire into the
effect of constitutional provisions.
The provisions in the Seventh Amendment to the Federal
Constitution regulating the right to jury trial apply only to cases
in the federal courts. 6' Practically all state constitutions, some
more emphatically than others, contain provisions for preservation
of the right to jury trial ;63 but only a few have provisions for the
purpose of preserving the fruits of the trial after it has culminated
in a verdict.6 4 A minority of the state constitutions and the Federal
6o Hickman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 30 W. Va. 296, 4 S. E. 654, 7 S. E.

455 (1887).

61 See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 482-4 (1935) ; (1935) 21 VA. L. REV.
670.
69 Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 294, 24 L. Ed. 436 (1877).
03 For a list of some of the provisions, see (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 675.
64 Only those of Oregon and West Virginia are listed in (1934) 44 YALE L.
J. 325, as additional to the Federal Constitution.
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Constitution, perhaps on the assumption that a party may get
little benefit from a jury trial if the court has power to meddle with
the result, have undertaken expressly to safeguard the verdict. The
provision in the Federal Constitution will serve as an example.
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.' ' 5
The right to jury trial contemplated and intended to be preserved must necessarily refer to the mode of jury trial prevailing in
any particular jurisdiction at the time when its constitution was
adopted. Consequently, it is held that the jury trial guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution is that which prevailed in England in
1791,66 and the jury trial mentioned in a state constitution must
be that which prevailed in the state at the time when its constitu67
tion was adopted.
It is conceded in the majority opinion in Dimick v. Schiedt,a8
which presents the most comprehensive judicial review of the subject, that the practice of allowing remittiturs was not unknown to
the common law of England prior to adoption of the Federal Constitution, but doubt is expressed as to whether sufficient precedents
existed at that time to give it recognition as a method of interfering with the verdict of a jury in a case involving unliquidated
damages. Cases in the state courts, where the question of constitutionality is considered at all, usually do not undertake to define the
status of jury trial, historically or otherwise; but merely discuss
the attributes of jury trial as a process assumed to be understood,
and reach the conclusion that a remittitur is or is not proper in a
given case, depending upon the preference given to arguments
hereinbefore noted as to the proper limits of the practice.
The common law which is prescribed as limiting methods of reexamination is understood to be the common law which prevailed in
the jurisdiction at the time when the constitution was adopted;09
and it seems to be conceded that a new trial was the only method
of review recognized by the common law at the time when the
65 U.

S.

CONST.,

SEVENTH AmENDMENT.

66 Dimick v. Sehiedt, 293 U. S. 474
67 Hickman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
S. E.455 (1887); Campbell v. Sutliff
68 Note 66 supra.
69 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474

(1935).
R., 30 W. Va. 296, 301, 4 S. E. 654, 7
193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W. 374 (1927).
(1935).
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Federal Constitution was adopted.70 Whether, after all, allowing
a remittitur amounts to re-examination of a fact found by a jury
is a question to be determined by the extent to which it substitutes
the judgment of the court for that of the jury; a controversial matter to be settled on the basis of considerations hereinbefore set forth.
The most ambitious judicial effort to sustain the remittitur
against arguments of unconstitutionality perhaps will be found in
the dissenting opinion to Dimick v. Schiedt 1 The arguments for
constitutionality would not seem to be very satisfying for those who
desire a settlement of the controversy on a logical basis. Where
the effort is not directed at a demonstration that allowing the
remittitur does not invade the province of the jury, it is mostly
based on the practical expediency of indulging in a practice that
will avoid new trials, and on generalities extolling progress and
condemning reliance on precedents. Attention is called to the
federal rule of practice giving the trial judge an absolute discretion
in the matter of granting a new trial because of an excessive verdict.
*Vhat are supposed to be analogous instances of interfering with
the normal course of jury trial are noted, such as aiding the jury
with findings by auditors, and supplementing the general verdict
with special findings on interrogatories, 2 devices which have been
approved by the courts as not infringing the jury's constitutional
prerogatives; but there is a failure to note that, in spite (or rather in
pursuance) of these devices, the court after all enters judgment on a
definite finding by the jury, whether general or special, and not on
an amount found by the auditor oi fixed by the court. The conventional generalities, that the common law must grow and constitutions must be elastic, the res gestae of those who find it necessary to take refuge in generalities, are mentioned. It is said that
the Constitution should not be construed "as intended to perpetuate in changeless form the minutiae of trial practice as it existed
in the English courts in 1791", and that the Seventh Amendment
to the Federal Constitution was intended merely "to preserve the
essentials of jury trial." This statement apparently is an echo
from prior statements made by courts and commentators with
1eference to the Seventh Amendment, such as "its aim is not to
70 Or a venire facias de novo, which amounts to the same thing.
See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447-8, 7 L. Ed. 732 (U. S. 1830), cited
and quoted in (1935) 21 VA. L. Rv.667. Also see (1934) 33 M_0H. L. REV.
139. Of course the contention of those favoring the remittitur is that its
allowance does not amount to any substantial re-examination of the verdict.
71293 U.S. 474, 488 (1935).
72

Idem, 491.
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preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of
right" ;73 or "This purpose the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
to be the preservation of the substance of trial by jury, not the
traditional forms of procedure." 7 4
Perhaps nobody will quarrel with these abstractions, so long
as they receive proper application and are not resorted to as a
procedural res gestaje; but to undertake to apply them to solution
of the problem at hand is a different thing. If the result of the
verdict (in the present case the amount) is not a matter of substance, it may very well be asked, What constitutes the substance
of a jury trial? What interest any party can have in a jury trial,
except on the expectation of a jury determination of his rights or
liabilities, is difficult to imagine.
Some commentators seem to assume that the re-examination
problem presents no difficulties in the majority of states," where
there is no re-examination clause in the constitutions." But, while
absence of the provision may lend assistance to arguments in favor
of constitutionality, it seems too much to assume that it disposes
of arguments to the contrary. That a party should be entitled to
It proper result determined by a jury trial would seem to be inherent in his right to a jury trial. The result, and not "the
minutiae of trial practice", is what is important to him. If his
right to a jury trial can be disposed of by going through the
formalities of a trial with an improperly functioning jury, then
throwing away the result and letting the court have a hand,7 the
constitutional guaranty of the right may have little efficacy.

THE ADDITUR.
There is not much to be said about the additur which has not
already been said about the remittitur. So far as encroaching
upon the right to a jury trial, or violating constitutional sanctions,
is concerned, there is essentially no distinction between them. On
a proper analysis the two will be found to be on a par in these
73 Quoted in (1935) 21 VA. L. Rzv. 66S, citing Walker v. New Mexico &
So. Pac. R. R., 165 U. S. 593, 17 S. Ct. 421, 41 L. Ed. 837 (1897); Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U. S. 494, 51 S. Ct. 513, 75 L.
Ed. 1188 (1913).
74 (1934) 44 YATE L. J. 324, citing the same cases.
7 See (1935) 21 VA. L. Rrv. 675; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 324-5.
76 See note 64 spra.
77"Furthermore- and this is of great importance - the constitutional
right is not nierely to trial by one jury, but by a properly functioning jury,
acting in obedience to the instructions of the court, and mindful of the law
and evidence." (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 670.
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respeets. 78 An inadequate amount of unliquidated damages found
by a jury and increased by an additur represents just as truly the
verdict of the jury as an excessive amount reduced by a remittitur.
In neither case is judgment entered for the amount found by the
jury, and in both cases the judgment of the court is equally substituted for that of the jury. The only circumstance that should
tempt anybody to make a distinction between the two is the fact
that the remittitur, clothed deceptively in a garb of respectability, is
subject, on the basis of a false analysis, to an illusory justification;
while the additur, free from deception, stands exposed in its true
light. Consequently, there is no substantial reason why the additur
should not be used in the same situations in which the remittitur
is used in the same jurisdiction: e. g., when the claim in litigation
is fixed and certain; when the amount of the deficiency can be determined by fixed rules of law; or even when the damages are
wholly unliquidated and uncertain, depending in each case upon
the policy of the court respecting remittiturs in a similar situation.
In fact, opportunity for application of the additur may be even
broader, owing to the fact that the defendant, and not the plaintiff,
is the party who consents to an additur. As hereinbefore noted,
it is not proper to impose the consequences of a remittitur upon the
defendant in a case where it appears that the same motive or misapprehension on the part of the jury which is responsible for the
excessive amount likewise affected the decision of liability, as
where the jury is motivated by passion and prejudice. The
propriety of allowing an additur is not affected by such a circumstance, since the defendant, by consenting to the additur, concedes
liability.
However, no intimation is intended that the additur has enjoyed such a comprehensive usage in practice. In fact (whether
deterred by the illusory distinction before mentioned and which
ill be discussed later, or for other reasons), the courts have made
very little use of additurs ;79 and nhere they have been used, it is
78 See dissenting opinion in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 488 (1935);
(1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 673-4; (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 324; (1934) 48 HAV.
L. REv. 333; (1934) 33 MIoH. L. REv. 138; (1934) 32 MICH. L. REv. 538.
79In two personal injury cases an additur was granted on the theory that
an additur and a remittitur are equally proper procedural devices. Gaffney
v. Illingsworth, 90 N. J. L. 490, 101 Atl. 243 (1917); Clausing v. IKershaw, 129
Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924). In American Railway Express Co. v. Bender,
20 Ohio App. 436, 152 N. E. 197 (1926), the court by way of dictum implies
approval of the same theory.
Apparently the practice has been so seldom attempted in the trial courts
that the appellate courts have had little opportunity to deal with its propriety.
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generally only in cases where the amount of the increase can
definitely be determined,"0 a unique exception being the practice
in Wisconsin, where an additur may be allowed in a case where
the measure of damages is uncertain, provided the defendant consents to such an increase that a further increase would warrant the
court in setting aside a verdict for the same amount as excessive a practice adopted to insure that the plaintiff shall have no ground
for complaint that he has been deprived of the fruits of a proper
jury trial."'
Although the federal decisions have had much influence in
establishing and maintaining the practice of allowing remittiturs
in unliquidated damage cases, it was not until 1934 that the question of allowing an additur in such a case came before the Supreme
Court of the United States for decision, in the case of Dimick V.
Schiedt. 5 Since this case illustrates the only rational process employed, within the observation of the writer, in an attempt to differentiate the remittitur and the additur, it is worthy of particular
attention.
The plaintiff sued the defendant in a federal district court to
Two cases where it was definitely disapproved are City of Grand Rapids v.
Coit, 149 Mich. 668, 113 N. W. 362 (1907); Bradwell v. Pittsburgh & W. E.
By., 139 Pa. 404, 20 Ati. 1046 (1891).
Where the jury has found for the defendant the court cannot fix an
amount and render judgment thereon for the plaintiff, because the jury has
found the issue on liability against plaintiff. Werner v. Bryden, 84 Cal. App.
472, 258 Pac. 138 (1927) ; Goldsmith v. Detroit, J. & C. By., 165 Mich. 177, 130
N. E. 647 (1911); Shanahan v. Boston & Northern St. By., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N.
E. 751 (1907). Contra: Stagg v. Broadway Garage Co., 87 Mont. 254, 286 Pac.
415 (1930), where the jury found for the defendant, who admitted that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover $9.50.
so In most of the cases the jury had failed to allow definitely calculable interest, as in Marsh v. Kendall, 65 Kan. 48, 68 Pac. 1070 (1902); Fall v. Tucker,
113 Kan. 713, 216 Pac. 283 (1923); Collins v. Carter, 155 Miss. 600, 125 So.
89 (1929) ; Calmon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N. W.
765 (1925); McAfee v. Dix, 101 App. Div. 69, 91 N. Y. Supp. 464 (1905);
Alloway v. City of Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S. W. 123 (1890); or calculated interest at an improper rate, as in Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866).
Other miscellaneous cases where the deficiency was definitely calculable are E.
Tris Napier Co. v. Glass, 150 Ga. 561, 104 S. E. 230 (1920); James v. Morey,
44 Ill. 352 (1867); Clark v. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, 140 N. B.
593 (1923). In Apperson-Lee Motor Co. v. Ring, 150 Va. 283, 143 S. E. 694
(1928), in effect an additur was allowed to fix the amount of damages to an
automobile at an amount conceded by the defendant; but the verdict for a
less amount was set aside and judgment rendered in pursuance of a statute.
Many of the cases cited in this and the preceding note are cited in (1935)
21 VA. L. REv. 674-5, and (1934) 44 YsnE L. J. 325, where, and in 46 C. J.
425, additional cases of less significance will be found.
81 Reuter v. Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795
(1915).
s2293 U. S. 474 (1935).
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recover damages for personal injuries. The jury returned a verdict
for $500.00, which the court, on the plaintiff's motion for a new
trial, deemed inadequate. The court ordered a new trial, on condition that the defendant should refuse to consent to an additur of
$1000.00. The defendant consented and judgment was rendered
for $1500.00. The plaintiff appealed. The judgment was reversed
in the circuit court of appeals by a majority of the court, on the
ground that the additur was improper. 3 The defendant appealed
to the Supreme Court, where the decision of the circuit court of
appeals disapproving the additur was affirmed, by a five to four
decision.
The majority opinion in the Supreme Court decision enters
into a historical review of the additur, as well as the remittitur,
finding no precedent for the additur prior to 1791 except an
analogous practice in actions for mayhem, where the court, upon
riewing the wound (super visUm vidneris), might award an extra
recovery. It is emphasized that this practice was not the modern
practice of allowing an additur, because the additional amount
was awarded absolutely and not as alternative to ordering a new
tial, the practice of granting new trials being in fact unknown at
that time; nor was the increase conditioned on consent of the defendant. M'oreover, it is noted, this ancient practice had been abandoned by the English courts long prior to 1791.
It seems rather plain, from the general purport of the opinion,
that the majority would have preferred to have disapproved the
additur on principles that would equally have condemned the
remittitur; but, feeling that the remittitur had become too firmly
established by prior decisions to be disturbed, found it necessary
to resort to a differentiation. The following quotation presents
the rationale of the attempt.
"Where the verdict is excessive, the practice of substituting a remission of the excess for a new trial is not without plausible support in the view that what remains is included in the verdict along with the unlawful excess-in that
sense that it has been found by the jury-and that the
remittitur has the effect of merely lopping off an excrescence.
But, where the verdict is too small, an increase by the court
is a bald addition of something which in no sense can be said
to be included in the verdict. When, therefore, the trial court
found that the damages awarded by the jury were so inadequate as to entitle the plaintiff to a new trial, how can it be
83

70 P. (2d) 558 (0. 0. A. Ist, 1934).
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held, with any semblance of reason, that the court, with the
consent of the defendant only, may, by assessing an additional
amount of damages, bring the constitutional right of the
plaintiff to a jury trial to an end in respect of a matter of
fact which no jury has ever passed upon either explicitly or
by implication ? To hold so is obviously to compel the plaintiff
to forego his constituti6nal right to the verdict of a jury and
accept 'an assessment partly made by a jury which has acted
improperly, and partly by a tribunal which has no power to
"'84

assess.'

It is obvious that the majority, in order to justify the attempted
differentiation, has adopted the theory which Professor Scott, in
the commentary hereinbefore quoted, 5 urged to support the
propriety of a remittitur; and, in so doing, has in effect lent formal
approval to the practice-which the whole tenor of its opinion shows
that its conscience repudiates.
The minority undertakes to justify the additur by demonstrating the propriety of a remittitur (advancing the arguments
hereinbefore noted in discussion of the remittitur) and insisting
that, since the two are similar in principle, they are equally justified.
"In neither does the jury return a verdict for the amount
actually recovered, and in both the amount of the recovery is
fixed, not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting the motion for a new trial." 8
Here the minority, confronted with its own dilemma, but recognizing the paramount urgency of invalidating the attempted differentiation, has neatly stated the argument of those who contend
that there is no justification for either the remittitur or the additur
in such cases, although it stoutly insists that both are proper. To
complicate matters further, it will be noted that to insist that the
remittitur and the additur are similar in principle and equally
appropriate and justifiable must amount to abandonment of what
has been said to be the best argument in favor of the remittitur 7-Professor Scott's argument that the jury has actually found the
residue resulting from the remittitur, on the theory that the verdict
includes its parts.88 Obviously such a mode of reasoning could not
be applied to an additur. Consequently, some other ground for
justification must be sought which will apply equally to the res4Dimiek v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 486.
85 See notes 48 and 49 supra.
86 Dimick
8

v.Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 494.

7See note 49

88

supra.

See notes 48 and 49 supra.
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mittitur and the additur, if their similarity in principle is to be
accepted.
The commentators seem to be agreed that the minority is correct in rejecting the validity of the majority's attempted differentiation, 9 although it does not follow that either is correct in
approval of the remittitur or the additur. In neither case has the
amount fixed by the court been found as the verdict of a jury. The
deception in the attempted differentiation arises because this fact is
obvious in the case of an additur, but in the case of a remittitur may
be obscured in a haze of abstract mathematics which has nothing
to do -with a true solution of what the jury actually decided. The
result must be, however regretful to state, that, as contended by
the minority, the court, in fixing the amount of a remittitur or an
additur, where the damages are unliquidated, simply abandons the
verdict of the jury and, looking to the evidence, finds (or at least
fixes) the amount which the plaintiff may recover. The word
"may" is used advisedly, because no jury has decided what the
amount of the recovery ought to be: and, depending upon the jurisdiction,9 the court may not attempt to do so, however important it
may seem for somebody to perform this function if justice is to be
done.
REmITTITURS AND AiDDITURS IN WEST VIRGINIA.

A topic discussing the additur under the West Virginia law
would be equivalent to Dean Wigmore's suggested chapter on the
ophidians in Ireland: there is simply nothing to discuss. If the
practice has ever been attempted in this state, there is nothing in
the decisions to indicate that the Supreme Court has ever been
called upon to decide its propriety. The remittitur has come up for
discussion in some two dozen cases.
The West Virginia decisions have consistently adhered to the
minority rule, the court refusing to allow a remittitur where the
amount of damages recoverable is .measureable by no definite
standard and the amount of the excess is equally indeterminable. 91
89 See note 78 supra.
90 Depending upon the jurisdiction, the amount may be fixed at the highest

or the lowest amount which would be tolerated in a verdict.
91 Vinal v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1 (1881) (malicious prosecution, remittitur
allowed by trial court disapproved, but verdict held not excessive); Unfried
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 34 W. Va. 260, 12 S. E. 512 (1890) (personal injuries);
Rodgers v. Bailey, 68 W. Va. 186, 69 S. E. 698 (1910) (action by wife for
selling intoxicants to husband); Hall v. The Philadelphia Co., 74 W. Va. 172,
81 S. E. 727 (1914) (personal damages from breach of contract); Lutz v.
City of Charleston, 76 W. Va. 657, 86 S. E. 561 (1915) (tort, casting water on
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It is said that a remittitur is not proper except where the amount
of the excess is ascertainable by the "nature of the case in issue", 2
or by "application of settled rules of law to the evidence";" and
that there must be "findings of fact by the jury justifying it," or
data before the court upon which it may be estimatedf 4 The
"data", it is said, must be such that "the court can ascertain the
exact amount of the excess.'"'9
The usual source of data is the
evidence," although other elements of the trial may be considered."
But even in a personal injury case, a remittitur may be allowed if
it is possible by the record to ascertain and eliminate an excess due
to inclusion of an illegal element of damage.0 8 Where justification
of the rule adhered to by the court is stated, the rule is justified on
the ground that to permit a contrary practice would 'amount to
substituting the judgment of the court for that of the jury, and so
allow the court to assume the functions of the jury."
The West Virginia Supreme Court has not been unaware of
the fact that it adheres to a minority rule, and in some instances
has followed the rule with reluctance. In one of the earlier cases1°
Judge Brannon, resorting to the familiar arguments of other jurisdictions, expressed a preference for the majority rule.
land of plaintiff); Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E.
659 (1916) (personal injuries); Cain v. Kanawha Traction & Electric Co., 81
-9r. Va. 631, 95 S. E. 88 (1918) (personal injuries); Thompson v. Davis
Colliery Co., 104 W. Va. 493, 140 S. E. 489 (1927); Pittsburgh-Wheeling Coal
Co. v. Wheeling Public Service Co., 106 W. Va. 206, 145 S. E. 272 (1928) (tort,
damage.to personal property). A remittitur cannot be allowed on evidence introduced after verdict. Duncan v. New River & Pocahontas Consolidated
Coal Co., 114 W. Va. 388, 174 S. E. 370 (1933).
92 Clark v. Lee, 76 W. Va. 144, 85 S. E. 64 (1915).
93 Vinal v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1 (1881) ; Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va.
718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894).
94 Unfried v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., Lutz v. City of Charleston; Watts v.
Ohio Valley Electric Ry., all supra note 91.
95 Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry., 78 W. Va. 114, 88 S. E. 659 (1916).
96 Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894); Rodgers
v. Bailey, Hall v. The Philadelphia Co., both supra note 91; Taylor v. Sturm
Lumber Co., 90 W. Va. 530, 111 S. E. 481 (1922).
97 For example, the instructions.
McCallam v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 93
Wr.Va. 426, 117 S. E. 148 (1923).
O8 Idem. In this case an infant sued for personal injuries. The declaration
claimed $500.00 for doctor's bills. The court instructed the jury that it might
include this item in its verdict. The Supreme Court held this an illegal
element of damages, the father being liable for the infant's medical expenses.
The plaintiff was allowed to remit $500.00, the largest amount that the jury
m-ight have found under the instruction.
99 Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric By.; Thompson v. Davis Colliery Co.; Pittsburgh-Wheeling Coal Co. v. Wheeling Public Service Co., all supra note 91.
100 Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894).
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"My opinion is that not only in actions for damages based
on contract, or for civil injuries, where the law furnishes rules
and principles for measuring damages, but also in actions
based on tort, though the law does not furnish such rules and
principles, but the amount of damages rests with fair, impartial, and enlightened conscience of a jury, on a motion for
a new trial the court may suggest or accept a less sum, and if
the plaintiff accepts it, overrule the defendant's motion for a
new trial. The authorities are somewhat divided. Earlier
authorities denied the proposition, perhaps, but later ones uphold it, and the great and decided preponderance of the highest authorities sustains it, to the ends of the exercise by the
court of a salutary power over verdicts, and especially to end
litigation." 01'
In a later decision, 1 2 where the action was to recover damages
for personal injuries, Judge Williams expressed an inclination to
follow the earlier views expressed by Judge Brannon, but considered the court committed to a contrary policy by precedents.
"In Ohio River R. R. Co. v. Blake, 38 W. Va., at page
724, Judge Brannon expresses doubt concerning the propriety
of the rule, saying it is against the weight of authority, especially the modern decisions, and he cites numerous cases, holding that the court can thus compel a plaintiff to remit a portion
of his damages when determined by it to be excessive. If the
point were one of first impression, I would be inclined to hold
with Judge Brannon. But, in view of the many decisions by
this court, following the rule, I feel bound by them."' 0'
In apparently the first case in which a remittitur was approved in this state, it was allowed, even after judgment had been
entered on the verdict, to reduce the amount of the recovery to the
amount of damages alleged in the declaration."0 4 Although this
was an action to recover damages for breach of a contract, there
isno reason why the court would not have applied the same rule in
any tort action for the recovery of damages, since the amount of
the excess is definitely ascertainable by application of a fixed legal
rule. A remittitur under such circumstances is now prescribed by
statute.101
In cases where the court has had a definite guide for the purpose of ascertaining the excess, it has been liberal in its application
101 Idem, 724.
10 Watts v. Ohio Valley Electric Ry., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S.

E.659 (1916).

Irem, 150.
104 Williams v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 9 W. Va. 33 (1876).
10 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 58, art 2, § 5.
103
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of the minority rule. A remittitur has been approved where the
amount of the excess could be determined from the nature of the
claim in action ;106 where, in a condemnation case, the court had
data before it based on the evidence for a proper determination of
the value of property taken and damaged ;107 where the excess was
ascertainable by legal construction of the contract sued upon;'18
where the amount of an improper element of damage was fixed by
uncontradicted evidence;109 where the jury's answers to interrogatories fixed the amount of improper elements included in the general
verdict ;110 where the excess was ascertainable from items of account
established by the evidence;"' where an excess of interest was due
to calculation from an improper date, and the proper date was
fixed by legal principles;"' where it appeared from the evidence
that calculation of the amount of recovery for personal services
was based on a wrong legal theory, and the proper amount could
be determined by application of true legal principles to the evidence;' 13 where the amount of a legally invalid claim was distinguishable from the amount awarded for valid claims." 4
In all these cases but one," 5 the action was a contract action,
where situations warranting a remittitur are peculiarly apt to develop; but in spite of general statements therein which might be
taken to the contrary, it evidently is not the policy of the court to
restrict the practice to contract actions. As heretofore noted, a
remittitur has been allowed even in a personal injury case where,
although the measure of recoverable damages was indefinite, the
amount of an illegal excess was definitely aseertainable." 0
On the other hand, general statements in the cases that might
be understood as implying that a remittitur is proper in all contract
'o First National Bank of Mannington v. Bank of Mannington, 76 W. Va.
356, 85 S. E. 541 (1915). Action on a promissory note. Amount of illegal
attorney's fee remitted.
107 Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894).
108 Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va. 143, 30 S. B. 95 (1898).
109 Chapman v. Beltz, 48 W. Va. 1, 35 S. E. 1013 (1900).
110 Bare v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., 73 W. Va. 632, 80 S. E. 941 (1914).
311 Clark v. Lee, 76 W. Va. 144, 85 S. E. 64 (1915).
12 Millan v. Bartlett, 78 W. Va. 367, 89 S. E. 711 (1916).
13. Taylor v. Sturm Lumber Co., 90 W. Va. 530, 111 S. E. 481 (1922).
"11 Southern Billiard Supply Co. v. Lopinsky, 93 W. Va. 214, 116 S. B.
253 (1923).
=5 Ohio River R. R.. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894) (condenonation proceeding).
11e McCallam v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 93 W. Va. 426, 117 S. E. 148 (1923),
note 98 m6pra.
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actions11 7 should not be interpreted literally.

In one case a re-

mittitur was refused in a contract action, because there were "no
data in the evidence" upon which the amount of the excess could
be ascertained. 118
No decision is found adjudicating the effect of passion and
prejudice, although Judge Brannon, by way of dictum, indicates
a preference for the more flexible rule, that possibility of a
remittitur should not be considered barred by passion and prejudice
where it appears that only the amount of the recovery was affected
thereby.
"Some of the cases admit a qualification in this: that
where, in cases of tort, the amount of damages found by a
jury is so enormous as to give evidence of prejudice, passion
or corruption in the jury, the verdict ought to be set aside, and
a new trial granted, without allowing a remittitur of part, and
this because if such bad influences operated in producing the
unjust verdict, so it likely operated upon the jury in passing
on other matters in the case. Lowenthal v. Streng, 90 Ill. 74;
Stafford v. Hair Cloth Co., 2 Cliff. 82. There is force in this
view, and yet why should not those other matters stand on their
own merits? If there was no issue, and only the quantum of
damages to be passed on by the jury, or if, where there are
other issues, and the finding as to them is plainly right, why
should not a remittiturbe allowed? True, in cases where the
case is nicely balanced, or involving credibility of witnesses, it
would seem proper to apply this qualification; but that is only
to say that this action is within the discretion of the court, and
this question only an element in its exercise, and it can refuse
a remittitur when it thinks bad influences may have tainted
the findings on other matters; for the allowance or disallowance
of a remittituris within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its refusal to allow it would not, as I think, be ground for
reversal.'

'1

The statements in the dicta quoted above constitute the only
instance noted where the Supreme Court has discussed discretion
in the trial court to permit or refuse a remittitur in cases where
circumstances are such as to permit a choice between a remittitur
and a new trial. Some cases have been reversed because of excessive
verdicts, with directions to the trial courts to offer the privilege of
a remittitur, but in each of these cases propriety of the remittitur
was plainly apparent and possibility of a discretion in the trial
11.7
Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 18 S. E. 957 (1894) ; Watts v.
Ohio Valley Electric Ry., 78 W. Va. 144, 88 S. E. 659 (1916).
11s Hall v. The Philadelphia Co., 74 W. Va. 172, 81 S. E. 727 (1914).
"3 Ohio River R. R. v. Blake, 38 W. Va. 718, 725-6, 18 S. E. 957 (1894).
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court, on a remanding of the case, to make a choice between a
remittitur and a new trial was not discussed. 120 The typical cases
in other jurisdictions calling for exercise of the trial court's discretion are cases involving unliquidated damages, a class of cases
in which remittiturs ordinarily are not allowed in West Virginia.
In the majority of cases, although the point seems never to
have come up for express adjudication, it appears to have been
assumed that it is the duty of the trial court, when a remittitur is
proper, of its own accord to offer the plaintiff an opportunity to
remit before ordering a new trial.1.2 1 In only one case does it appear
to be assumed that the trial court was warranted in ordering a new
trial when a remittitur was proper because the plaintiff failed to
claim the privilege on his own initiative."12 Most of the decisions
are emphatic in the assertion that, even in cases where a remittitur
is plainly proper, a remittitur cannot be forced on the plaintiff,
and the court cannot arbitrarily reduce the amount."'
Only one
case is found where the court "amended" the verdict and entered
judgment, apparently without consent of the plaintiff; and this was
a case where there was no dispute as to the facts and the excess
was" ascertainable by arithmetical computation controlled by "a

pure question of law' '.

2

4

In most cases where a judgment on an excessive verdict is reversed in the Supreme Court and a remittitur is deemed proper,
the case is remanded to the trial court, with directions to permit
the plaintiff to accept a remittitur or submit to a new trial, without
comment as to the possibility of entering judgment above on a
proper residue.' 2 ' The typical practice seems to be that prescribed
in Taylor v. Sturm Lumber Company,'2 as follows.
Vo First National Bank of Mannington v. Bank of Mannington, 76 W. Va.
356, 85 S. E. 54:1 (1915); Taylor v. Sturm Lumber Co., 90 W. Va. 530, 111
S. E. 481 (1922); McCallam v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 93 W. Va. 426, 117 S.
H. 148 (1923).
101 See same citations.
IZI Jones v. Kessler, 98 W. Va. 1, 126 S. E. 344 (1925).
103 Rodgers v. Bailey, 68 W. Va. 186, 69 S. E. 698 (1910) ; Bare v. Victoria
Coal & Coke Co., 73 W. Va. 632, 80 S. E. 941 (1914); Clark v. Lee, 76 W. Va.
144, 85 S. E. 61 (1915); First National Bank of Mannington v. Bank of
Mannington, 76 W. Va. 356, 85 S. E. 541 (1915); Flanagan v. Flanagan Coal
Co., 77 W. Va. 757, 88 S. E. 397 (1916); Cox & Co. v. Carter Coal Co., 81 W.
Va. 555, 94 S. E. 956 (1918). Apparently contra: Millan v. Bartlett, 78 W.
Va. 367, 89 S. E. 711 (1916).
124 Milan v. Bartlett, spra.
125 See cases cited in notes 106-114.
12" 90 W. Va. 530, 111 S. E. 481 (1922).
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"If the jury, in assessing damages, allows too much by
a sum -definitely ascertainable as to amount, from the evidence,
by reason of the adoption of a legally erroneous basis of estimate and allowance, it is the duty of the trial court, on the
motion for a new trial, to put the plaintiff to his election as to
whether he will remit the excessive sum included in the verdict
or suffer the verdict to be set aside; and, if this duty is omitted
by such court and judgment rendered on the verdict, the
appellate court will reverse the judgment, without disturbance
of the verdict, and remand the case for proper action by the
trial court, on the verdict."
In one case this practice was followed because the items of
account involved could "be more readily and safely ascertained in
the court below, with the assistance of counsel", than in the appellate court.127 However, in two cases the plaintiff was permitted
to make his election in the appellate court and take judgment there
28
for a residue fixed by it.
As hereinbefore noted, the West Virginia court has never
considered the propriety of allowing a remittitur in the light of
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to a jury trial. If
it should be found necessary, at some time in the future, to appraise
the effect of constitutional guaranties, on a question of shifting to
a more liberal rule in the use of remittiturs, or of adopting the
additur, it is pertinent to note that our constitution is one of the
minority of constitutions which, like the Federal Constitution, have
the most emphatic provisions for preservation of the right to jury
trial
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars exclusive of interest and costs, the
right of trial by jury, if required by either party, shall be
preserved; and in such suit before a justice a jury may consist of six persons. No fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any case than according to the rules of the
common law. '129
It should also be noted that in this state a trial court does not
have an absolute discretion, as do the federal courts, to grant or
refuse a new trial when a verdict is excessive. A statute in this
state provides that a writ of error may be granted when a verdict
is either excessive or inadequate.3 0 Hence one of the considerations
127 Clark v. Lee, 76 W. Va. 144, 85 S. E. 64 (1915).
12 8 Chapman v. Beltz, 48 W. Va. 1, 35 S. B. 1013 (1900); Southern Billiard
Supply Co. v. Lopinsky, 93 W. Va. 214, 116 S. E. 253 (1923).
12 W. VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
130 W. VA. Ru. CODE (1931) e. 56, art, 6, § 38.
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which has been chiefly relied upon by the federal courts to justify
remittiturs in unliquidated damage cases will have no fokce in West
Virginia.
C NCLUSION.

What has been said in this discussion is in no sense intended
to indicate a personal preference for the practice which limits the
use of either the remittitur or the additur. The object has been to
seek the truth, however unpalatable. It is believed that no legal
approach can be justified which evades realities and leads to inconsistencies, however desirable the goal, and however difficult to
reach the goal by an alternative path. It is assumed that the days
of legal fictions are past.
The expediency of indulging in a liberal use of the remittitur
and the additur, with appellate check upon the discretion of the
trial court, may be conceded without argument. There are no doubt
many cases in which the interests of both parties to the litigation
would be served by permitting the court to substitute its judgment
for that of the jury, when an excessive or inadequate verdict has
been found, in lieu of granting a new trial; just as there are many
cases where both parties, really seeking justice, would profit by
submitting to the court in the first instance both the question of
liability and the amount of the recovery, as is often done by agreement. But as long as the law, particularly in the form of constitutional sanctions, gives to a party the right to a jury trial,'it would
seem that the right should carry with it the privilege of determining
its expediency. The only object in protecting the right with constitutional sanctions must have been to give a litigant power to
make an arbitrary choice and prevent legislators and courts from
determining any question of expediency. Otherwise, the whole
matter would have been trusted ti legislative and judicial regulation.
The writer has an abundance of sympathy for the motives of
those who argue for the legality and constitutionality of the more
liberal practice, even if the argument is motivated by an inarticulate assumption that the end justifies the means; but he cannot
cheerfully accede to the accusation that those who see difficulties in
the way may be charged with a lack of realism. Those who indulge
in such an accusation should beware of the rebound. If there ever
was anything which needed the aid of sophistry and artificial logic,
it would seem to be a demonstration that the court, when it allows
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a remittitur or an additur under ordinary circumstances in a personal injury case, does not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury. If the substitution takes place, how can it be asserted with
any semblance of realism that the jury has tried the case and the
parties have had a jury trial? Those who assert the contrary do
not need to resort to the "legal scrap heap", or any other source
of precedents, to defend their stand. All that is necessary is to
face the situation with a realism unadulterated with preference and
let common sense have full sway.
As a last thought, attention may be called to a legitimate practice that no doubt would have a tendency in some cases to discourage
new trials in those jurisdictions, including West Virginia, where a
remittitur is not permissible for such a purpose. If the practice
of granting a new trial confined to an inquiry of damages, when the
only error is an excessive verdict, is liberally pursued, a defendant
may be encouraged to join with the plaintiff in consenting to a
remittitur, since doubtless his interest in a new trial is frequently
enhanced by a hope that anotlier jury may free him entirely from
liability. If both parties agree, of course propriety of the remittitur
cannot be questioned. The practice of granting new trials confined
to the quantum of damages, although widely resorted to in other
jurisdictions, and approved by the West Virginia Supreme
Court, 131 seems to have received little recognition in the local trial
courts.
131 See Chafin v. Norfolk & W. R. R., 80 W. Va. 703, 93 S. E. 822 (1917);
Stone v. United Fuel Gas Co., 111 W. Va. 569, 573, 163 S. E. 48 (1932).
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